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Racial Fault-lines in “Baseball’s Great
Experiment:” Black Perceptions, White
Reactions
Henry D. Fetter
 
Introduction
1 Over sixty years after his first appearance in a Brooklyn Dodger uniform in the spring of
1947, the broader social significance of Jackie Robinson’s breaking major league baseball’s
color line remains subject to debate. “The saga of Robinson’s first season has become a
part of American mythology,” the late Jules Tygiel wrote in his classic account of the
integration of baseball, “sacrosanct in its memory, magnificent in its retelling. […] It is a
tale of courage, heroics, and triumph. Epic in its proportions, the Robinson legend has
persevered […] because the myth, which rarely deviates from reality, fits our national
perceptions of fair play and social progress” (Tygiel, 1983, 206). “The events unleashed by
the  historic  alliance  between  Robinson  and  Rickey  significantly  altered  American
society,” and even “if the vision of an integrated and equal society, free from racism and
discrimination, which impelled Rickey and Robinson to launch their ‘great experiment,’
remains unfulfilled,” Tygiel concluded, “their efforts have brought it closer to reality”
(Tygiel, 1983, 343-44).
2 Robinson himself later recalled that “integration in baseball has already proved that all
Americans can live together in peaceful competition” (Robinson, 1964, 11). Monte Irvin,
the first black ball player signed by Brooklyn’s arch rivals, the New York Giants, similarly
claimed that “baseball has done more to move America in the right direction than all the
professional patriots with their billions of cheap words” (quoted in Robinson, 1964, 96).
When Robinson died in  1972,  veteran New York  Times sports  writer  Leonard Koppett
summed up his legacy by writing, “the consequences of the waves his appearance made
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spread far  beyond baseball,  far  beyond sports,  far  beyond politics,  even to  the  very
substance of a culture.” (quoted in Tygiel, 1983, 344).
3 This heroic narrative has, however, met with resistance from those who have questioned
the actual impact of “baseball’s great experiment” on American race relations in general.
Fifty years after Robinson’s 1947 breakthrough, historian Joram Warmund wrote that
“baseball supposedly was one of the great definers and influencers of American values.
Yet, it did not have the spillover effect one might have expected; certainly not in the
immediate future […] even if ‘baseball’ was progressive, its influence was either not that
great or it was of a more subtle and long-range nature” (Warmund, 1998, 8-9). In his
recent account of  the struggle for civil  rights in the north,  Thomas Sugrue similarly
expressed doubts about the broader significance of Robinson’s example:
In 1947, when the Brooklyn Dodgers fielded Jackie Robinson, the event became a
barometer of changing race relations and a reminder of how deeply entrenched
racial hostility remained in the North. [...] By the time of his retirement in 1957,
Robinson had become a celebrity whose personal life was fodder for the black press
and whose compelling story of triumph over racial injustice turned him into the
white media’s feel-good example of America’s changing racial order. But Robinson’s
breakthrough, however celebrated, was largely symbolic. It would take much more
than  a  handful  of  black  sports  heroes  to  transform  race  relations  in  postwar
America (Sugrue, 2008, 121). 
4 This essay will not attempt to adjudicate between these differing perspectives, both of
which  might  be  said  to  suffer  from the  “hindsight  bias”  inherent  in  evaluating  the
significance of a past event in the unavoidable light cast by knowing what happened.
Instead, it  will  examine  three  facets  of  “baseball’s  great  experiment”  based  on  the
contemporaneous  record—the  perception  of  blacks,  the  response  of  white  players
(whether teammates or opponents),  and the reaction of  baseball  fans.  The goal  is  to
portray the context within which baseball’s color line was broken and to illuminate the
fault-lines that characterized race relations within both the sport of baseball and the
larger society as each was confronted with new challenges to long established policies
and practices in the years after the Second World War.
 
Black Perceptions, White Motives
5 Wendell Smith, sports columnist for the Pittsburgh Courier, a widely circulated African-
American newspaper, was perhaps the most prominent black sports writer in the 1940s.
Long a crusader for the integration of major league baseball, Smith was hired by Brooklyn
Dodger team president and general manager Branch Rickey to act as Jackie Robinson’s
spokesman  and  roommate  during  Robinson’s  first  season  with  the  Dodgers.  In  that
capacity, Smith was the ghost writer of Robinson’s weekly record of his rookie season
under the title “Jackie Robinson Says” for theCourier, and would later do the same for
Jackie Robinson: My Own Story, the autobiography published in the spring of 1948 (Wiggins,
1983, 5-29). However, one theme that Smith emphasized in his own writing was surely not
what Rickey had in mind when he forged that protective and mutually advantageous
relationship between rookie ball player and veteran reporter. It was one, however, that
likely  resonated  with  readers  of  theCourier who  were  not  inclined  to  assume  white
benevolence when it came to dealing with blacks.
6 That theme, pounded out over and over again in Smith’s coverage of Robinson’s debut
with the Dodgers, was that Rickey’s motivation in signing Robinson was the resulting
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financial gain that would accrue to the Dodgers and Rickey. Smith repeatedly dwelled on
the financial aspect of “baseball’s great experiment.” Most famously, Smith coined the
still oft cited jingle “Jackie’s nimble/Jackie’s quick/ Jackie’s making the turnstiles click.” (
Pittsburgh Courier [PC]31 May 1947). “Crowds like these,” Smith wrote of the Dodgers’ pre-
season exhibition series against the Yankees, “represent money. Rickey knows that, and
is now satisfied that he made a good business deal when he signed Jackie to a Brooklyn
contract” (PC 19 April 1947). Smith continued:
Rickey  is  a  shrewd  businessman.  He  knew  when  he  signed  Jackie  that  he  had
cornered the greatest drawing card since Babe Ruth. Robinson will probably prove
to be the best drawing card in baseball during the 1947 season. In the meantime
Rickey is sitting in the office counting out the money (PC 19 April 1947).
7 As Smith accompanied the Dodgers around the National League circuit that spring, he
toted up a total of 358,046 fans who had paid their way in to see the Dodgers in New York,
Philadelphia, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, Chicago and St. Louis. After the Dodgers attracted a
record crowd of 46,572 to Chicago’s Wrigley Field,  Smith wrote “that amazing crowd
merely proved to dubious owners that Branch Rickey grabbed a copper-colored gold mine
when he signed Jackie Robinson” (PC 24 May 1947). Smith dubbed Robinson “Mr. Drawing
Power.” “This much is certain,” Smith wrote, “the fans want to see Jackie,” and “merely
prove the shrewdness of Branch Rickey and how smart he was in signing up Robinson. If
the Dodgers play good enough ball to stay in the race, Mr. Rickey will be carrying his
money home in sacks (first base sacks, that is) come the September breezes” (PC 31 May
1947). According to Smith, Dodger statistician Allen Roth, who traveled with the team,
was not there “to chart the playing prospects of the Dodgers.” “Actually,” Smith claimed,
“the figure Filbert was concerned with was Robinson’s draw at the gate. While Branch
Rickey hopes eventually to see Jackie Robinson accepted as just another ballplayer, he is
not overlooking the novelty value of his colored star at this time” (PC 14 June 1947).
8 In  fact,  some of  what  Smith  wrote  in  pursuit  of  this  theme exaggerated  Robinson’s
drawing power. The 79,441 fans attending the Dodgers’ three game pre-season exhibition
series against the Yankees in April 1947, which featured Robinson’s first appearances in
Brooklyn  livery,  was  not  “about  twice  as  many  fans  as  the  Yankees  and  Brooklyn
attracted in annual spring exhibition before,” as Smith claimed (PC19 April 1947), but just
slightly more than the 73,438 who had attended the three game set in 1946. Nor was
Smith correct when he cited the 30,847 fans at the Sunday finale of the 1947 series as
“probably the biggest crowd to see an exhibition game in the history of the majors” (PC 19
April 1947); just one year earlier, on 14 April 1946, 33,187 fans had attended that day’s
Dodger-Yankee clash. 
9 More  generally,  much  of  the  ballyhoo  then  and  later  about  Robinson’s  unmatched
drawing power ignored the fact that Dodger home game attendance in 1947 was just
slightly higher than in 1946 (1,807,526 compared to 1,796,824) and that, although Dodger
road game attendance in Robinson’s first season increased by 21% over the 1946 mark
(1,863,000 in 1947,  1,534,000 in 1946),  attendance in games at  “enemy” ballparks not
involving Brooklyn increased by a comparable 20.5% (Fetter, 1998, 183-192). The rising
tide of the post-war baseball boom was lifting all boats—if Branch Rickey was “sitting in
the office counting out the money,” so too were his less venturesome peers.  In fact,
Rickey did not need Robinson to be sitting atop the National League’s most lucrative
franchise. 
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10 Nor did Smith do justice to the record when he suggested that Boston city councilman
Isadore Muchnick was similarly motivated by self interest when he pressured the Red Sox
into  giving  a  group  of  black  ballplayers,  organized  by  Smith  and  including  Jackie
Robinson,  a  tryout  in  the  spring  of  1945.  The  Jewish  Muchnick,  Smith claimed,  was
seeking electoral advantage by seizing on the baseball integration issue in order to win
favor in his largely black council district (Norwood and Brackman, 1999, 124-25). In fact,
Muchnick’s  district  was  almost  entirely  white  and  Jewish  at  the  time  as  historians
Stephen Norwood and Harold Brackman demonstrated in an important article based on
detailed examination of contemporary census data (Norwood and Brackman, 1999, 125).
As journalist John Gunther wrote at the time, “there are […] sixty thousand Jews packed
in a single ‘sociological enclave’ in one Boston district, who form the most solidly Jewish
community  in  the  whole  country”  (Gunther,  1947,  516).  Nevertheless,  the  narrowly
political and self-interested—but erroneous—explanation for Muchnick’s effort advanced
by Smith has been endorsed by numerous writers,  including Jackie Robinson himself
(Norwood and Brackman, 1999, 124-25; Rowan, 1960, 97). Indeed, according to the most
recent  full-length  account  of  the  Jackie  Robinson  story,  Smith  claimed  entirely
undeserved credit for putting the idea of challenging the color line in Muchnick’s head in
the first place (Eig, 2008, 135). 
11 By deprecating Muchnick’s initiative in this fashion, Smith provided a striking example of
the view, that would come to be held by influential figures in the black community, that
Jewish involvement  in the civil  rights  movement  was motivated by self-interest,  not
common concerns, let alone idealism (Friedman, 1995, 7-9). More generally, that blacks
might question, or be wary of,  white motives in civil  rights initiatives would become
manifest with the rise of the black power movement in the 1960s, but it was a note that
Smith was  already sounding (to  those  who troubled to  listen)  even at  a  moment  of
triumph for the multi-racial partnership that Rickey and Robinson so publicly and so
productively represented.
 
Teammates and Opponents: Integration and Its Limits
12 If white self-interest, in the form of Dodger president Branch Rickey’s financial return on
Robinson’s  breakthrough,  provided  an  important  theme  for  Smith’s  coverage  of
Robinson’s rookie season, so too did Rickey and other baseball executives have to take
into account the self-interest of the one group of whites most directly affected by the
sport’s  integration—the  existing  all  white  cadre  of  professional  ballplayers,  whether
already  in  the  major  leagues  or  in  the  minor  leagues  and  aspiring  to  that  status.
Resentment  and opposition from fellow ballplayers  might,  of  course,  have well  been
expected, and not for narrowly racist reasons alone. In 1947, the sixteen clubs in the
Major Leagues stood at the thin apex of a massive pyramid of talent in organized baseball,
all of it white. For every one of the 400 (white) men on major league rosters, there were
25 potential replacements on the almost 500 minor league teams then competing in five
dozen leagues—a total of about 10,000 minor leaguers, white to the last man (U.S. Senate,
1953, 19). 
13 An influx of talent from any new source posed a direct threat to the aspirations, not to
mention  the  livelihood,  of  these  thousands  at  a  time  when  almost  everyone  in  the
professional  baseball  world entered it  after high school  graduation,  at  most,  and the
likely alternative to a career in baseball for many was the mine, the mill, the farm or the
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filling station. This was a ready-made formula for hostility. After all, during the recent
war, the entry of blacks into jobs previously reserved for whites, had unleashed “hate”
strikes and other protests from embittered and resentful white war workers, not only in
Alabama shipyards or Baltimore defense plants, but in Detroit auto factories, and the
Philadelphia transit system, conflicts which even the overriding exigencies of wartime
had been unable to prevent (Polenberg, 1972, 120-21; Burns, 1970, 462, 510; Glazer and
Hoffman, 1944, 306-8). 
14 There was  no reason to  believe  that  the  tightly  knit,  segregated world of  organized
baseball would be any different. Major leaguers were concerned about the competition
they would face if their all white ranks were opened to blacks (Lowenfish, 2007, 381). As
Negro League star Buck O’Neill  would later observe,  “for Jackie to play in the major
leagues, that meant that one white boy wasn’t going to play” (quoted in Ward and Burns,
1994, 230). Indeed, it would not be until July 1947, over a year and a half after Robinson
had signed a  contract  with the Dodger organization,  that  another major  league club
followed Rickey’s  lead.  Bill  Veeck the liberal  minded owner of  the Cleveland Indians
recalled that, when he met with Cleveland ball players after engaging Larry Doby as the
team’s (and American League’s) first black player, “there were a couple of grumbles [...]. I
think it represented an economic threat to them” (quoted in Tygiel, 1983, 215). 
15 At the time he signed Doby, Veeck explained that “Robinson has proved to be a real big
leaguer, so I wanted to get the best available Negro boy while the getting was good. “Why
wait?” (New York Times, 4 July 1947). “The entrance of Negroes into the majors is not only
inevitable—it is here,” Veeck said, which the press understood him to mean that “a wide-
open scramble for Negro players now was under way” (New York Times,  4  July 1947).
Rickey, for his part, was said to anticipate that within a year or so the color line would be
eradicated completely from baseball (“Veeck Predicts,” 16 July 1947)1. Within two weeks,
however, Veeck was beating a hasty retreat, telling reporters that
fewer than six players worthy of consideration remain in the Negro leagues [...] [A]s
the years go by, we’ll have an increasing number of colored boys in the majors. But
now, there is no chance of a large-scale influx [...]. At present there is no possibility
that Negro players will be arriving in wholesale numbers in the majors (“Best Negro
Players Already Taken,” 30 July 1947).
16 Surprisingly, Branch Rickey was reported to concur with Veeck’s assessment of the lack
of big league talent among the current crop of black ball players and that “I don’t believe
that too many [black ball players] will make good, not enough for distribution around the
National and American leagues. (Tygiel, 1983, 225; “Veeck Predicts,” 16 July 1947)2. 
17 Jules Tygiel has written that “the rationale for these proclamations remains unclear”
since  “both the  Dodgers  and Indians  had scouting  reports  that  indicated otherwise”
(Tygiel,  1983,  225).  One  possible  explanation,  consistent  with  Rickey’s  cautiously
elaborate, perhaps even overly so, preparations for Robinson’s break through (see Tygiel,
1983, 161-63; Mann, 1963, 160-65), is that Rickey had read with interest Gunnar Myrdal’s
monumental  study of An American Dilemma:  The Negro Problem and American Democracy
when it was published in 1944 (Lowenfish, 2007, 351). Myrdal’s formula for the successful
integration of the work force, consciously or not, was replicated by Rickey, and organized
baseball generally, when it came to introducing blacks into the major leagues. “If Negro
workers are introduced a few at a time,” Myrdal wrote, “if they are carefully picked, if the
leaders of the white workers are taken into confidence, and if the reasons for the action
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are explained, then the trouble can be minimized, and the new policy may eventually
become successful” (Myrdal, 1962, 389; Jennings, 2007). 
18 In  a  preview  of  the  Supreme  Court’s  “all  deliberate  speed”  1955  mandate  for
implementing  its  public  school  integration  decision  inBrown  v.  Board  of  Education,
gradualism prevailed when it came to the entry of black ball players into major league
baseball (Lowenfish, 2008, 52-61). Robinson’s and Doby’s debuts in 1947 did not signal an
all out assault on the segregationist patterns that remained entrenched in much of the
baseball world. Five years later, only six of the sixteen major league clubs had blacks on
their rosters. It would not be until 1957 in the National League and 1959 in the American
League that the last holdouts to integrating their rosters (the St. Louis Cardinals and the
Boston Red Sox, respectively) would give way. Nor did the breaking of the color line
transform traditional perspective on issues of race. The Sporting News, baseball’s weekly
paper  of  record,  had  been  gracious  enough  to  transcend  its  previous  segregationist
rhetoric  and  honor  Jackie  Robinson  as  its  first  Rookie  of  the  Year  in  1947,  but  an
insensitive mindset persisted among its staff that could produce the caption “Toiling on
the Tribe Plantation” for an April 1949Sporting Newsphotograph of several blacks in the
Cleveland farm system (“Toiling on the Tribe Plantation,” 13 April 1949)3. 
19 Viewed in retrospect,  what is especially striking is that the slow and limited pace of
integration did not prevent those who had supported Robinson’s challenge to the color
bar from passing favorable judgment on the state of the sport’s race relations at the time.
In a survey of the state of the sport’s race relations that was published in 1954, Dan
Dodson, a white New York University sociology professor and civil rights activist who had
been an advisor to Rickey, observed that there were 22 blacks then playing in the Major
Leagues (out of about 400 regular players) and that one half of the 16 teams in the big
leagues, remained all white. What might well have appeared as strong evidence of the
persistence of the sport’s segregationist traditions did not deter Dodson from declaring
victory  in  the  fight  against  racism  in  baseball.  Writing  that  such  continued  racial
exclusion involved “only eight clubs,” [emphasis added] Dodson’s upbeat conclusion was
that “in eight years America’s most prominent national sport has moved from a tradition
of seventy years discrimination to almost complete integration” [emphasis added] (Dodson,
1954, 73). 
20 Yet however slowly the number of blacks in the major leagues increased after 1947, overt
racial tensions would flare up from time to time, sometimes in surprising places. Eddie
Stanky,  a  supportive  teammate  to  Robinson  in  his  difficult  rookie  season,  would
orchestrate a barrage of racially tinged bench jockeying as the manager of the Cardinals
five years later (Prince, 1996, 11-12; Tygiel, 1983, 308). Even more notably, and contrary to
the public depiction of the team as a color blind band of brothers, the integration of the
Dodgers triggered racial tension in the clubhouse that came to a head when Robinson
replaced veteran Billy Cox at third base to make room for rookie Gilliam at second in 1953
(Prince, 1996, 11-15; Tygiel, 1983, 307-8; Rampersad, 1997, 173). It may well have been that
it was precisely the slow pace of integration that mitigated an adverse reaction from
white major leaguers in the years after Jackie Robinson’s breakthrough. 
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In the Grandstand and Beyond: What Price
Integration?
21 It has become a commonplace to salute the setting for the breaking of baseball’s color line
and say that “if Jackie Robinson was the ideal man to break the color barrier, Brooklyn
was  the  ideal  place”  (Veeck,  1976,  178).  According  to  the  editors  of  an  important
symposium on Robinson and “race,  sports  and the American dream,”  “a  mélange of
ethnicities, a pastiche of cultures, [Brooklyn] [...] proved a hospitable laboratory for the
‘great experiment’. It can be said forcefully —indeed proclaimed proudly—that Brooklyn
was central in challenging our nation’s pervasive racism” (Dorinson and Warmund, 1998,
xxi). “Why was it that when Jackie came up to the Dodgers in 1947, he was beloved in
Brooklyn but hated just about every place else?” oral historian Peter Golenbock recently
asked (Golenbock, 2008, 665).
22 However, the reality was more complicated, as indeed Golenbock himself had previously
recognized. “There were blue collar adults,” Peter Golenbock recorded in his oral history
of  the  Dodgers  first  published  in  1984,  “who  loathed  what  Robinson’s  presence
symbolized: rivalry from the Negro worker”. As one of his interviewees then recalled,
when  Jackie  Robinson  came  up  there  were  a  lot  of  adults  who  dropped  their
allegiance to the Dodgers. There was a lot of bigotry, among the working class more
than anything: the Irish, the Italians, the Swedes. They said, ‘I’m never gonna root
for them again, Goddamn it.’ It was a lot of union guys saying, ‘Sure, first they get
into baseball, and then they’ll be taking my job’ (Golenbock, 2000, 148). 
23 Social  historian  Carl  E.  Prince  has  described  heightened  racial  tensions  between
Brooklyn’s entrenched white ethnic groups and the increasing numbers of newly arriving
blacks in the years after World War II. “Despite the presence of black ballplayers,” the
Dodgers  “did  not  build  a  bridge  to  African-Americans  in  Brooklyn,”  Prince  writes,
concluding that “an increasing black presence in the population sent out shock waves, a
reaction seemingly divorced from the example of Brooklyn’s almost uniquely integrated
ball club” (Prince, 1996, 113-15). Some fans, particularly those of a progressive political
bent such as future civil liberties lawyer Ira Glasser may have celebrated the fact that “in
1947  Ebbets  Field  was  the  only  integrated  public  accommodation  in  America”
(Golenbock,  2008,  165).  Historian of  “Working Class  New York”  Joshua Freeman has,
however, observed that “integration brought tension to the stands at Ebbets Field, which
were no longer homogeneously filled by working-class white men” (Freeman, 2000, 34).
The extent to which “the Dodger faithful, perhaps begrudgingly, accepted or were even
proud of the team’s role in breaking down racial exclusion,” as Freeman also contends,
may be doubted (Freeman, 2000, 34). 
24 The increased black presence in the Ebbets Field grandstand reflected the changing racial
composition of the Dodgers’ home borough—but with a significant difference. During the
1940s,  the  black  population  of  Brooklyn  had  increased  from  107,263  to  208,478
(Rosenwaike, 1972, 133). The increase did not mark a breakdown in existing patterns of
residential  racial  segregation.  Almost  two  thirds  of  the  black  population  was
concentrated in the Bedford-Stuyvesant neighborhood in north central Brooklyn (whose
proximity to Ebbets Field spurred black attendance at the nearby ballpark, but would
become of increasing concern to Dodger management as it considered the future of the
team in Brooklyn over the ensuing decade) whose black population more than doubled in
Racial Fault-lines in “Baseball’s Great Experiment:” Black Perceptions, White...
Transatlantica, 2 | 2011
7
the 1940s from 65,166 to 137,436 (Freeman, 2000, 183). “It was during this decade that
Bedford-Stuyvesant  as  a  large,  impacted,  overwhelmingly  black  ghetto  was  formed”
(Freeman,  2000,  183;  Connolly,  1977,  130).  Meanwhile,  vast  swatches  of  the  borough
remained almost entirely white, and Brooklyn’s “segregation index” actually increased
during the 1940s, indicating “the pervasive character of racial segregation” (Connolly,
1977, 142 n. 4; Wilder, 2000, 202-4)4. Jackie Robinson himself had trouble finding suitable
housing when he first joined the Dodgers, and when he did move, along with his wife and
young son, into a largely white neighborhood, the new local hero faced opposition from a
number of their new neighbors (Rampersad, 1997, 195-96). 
25 Accompanying the upward spike in black population between 1940 and 1950, and “equally
portentous  for  Brooklyn’s  demographic  future,  was  a  modest  50,000  decline  in  the
number of  its  white  residents,  the first  such decrease since the eighteenth century”
(Connolly, 1977, 129), as a number of white neighborhoods experienced net population
losses (Wilder, 2000, 194-95). That out-migration would become a flood in the 1950s as
almost  half  a  million  whites  headed  to  the  suburbs  in  that  decade  while  the  black
population  increased  to  371,405  (Rosenwaike,  1972,  133,  136-37).  In  the  critical
assessment of Craig Steven Wilder, “the integration of its famous baseball team was a
mild accomplishment when measured against Brooklyn’s extraordinary social divisions”
(Wilder, 2000, 209). Wilder has even argued that “by attacking Jim Crow in professional
sports, local officials were able to grandstand as champions of racial equality without
tackling the politically costly issues of employment and housing discrimination” (Wilder,
2000, 208). 
26 Within  a  demographic  setting  undergoing  rapid  change,  Ebbets  Field  provided  a
decidedly  unfamiliar  breach  in  a  social  order  that  remained  largely  segregated  and
provided a racially mixed ambiance that may well have been uncomfortable to many of
the  team’s  traditional  fans.  Beginning  with  Wendell  Smith,  the  contention  has  been
repeatedly made that Brooklyn’s breaking of the major league baseball color line paid
dividends at the box office. Indeed, Smith’s bottom line oriented assessment of Rickey’s
motives would be shared by Walter O’Malley, Rickey’s successor at the Dodgers’ helm,
who  told  Roger  Kahn,  chronicler  of  Brooklyn’s  legendary  “boys  of  summer,”  that
“Rickey’s Brooklyn contract called for salary plus a percentage of the take, and during
World War II the take fell off. It was then Rickey mentioned signing a Negro. He had a
fiscal interest”  (Kahn,  1972,  426).  A  similar  perspective  has  also  been  advanced  by
prominent legal scholar Michael Klarman. In a revisionist assessment that downplays the
role of the courts in the dismantling of segregation, Klarman has written that
black economic clout also played an important role  in the desegregation of  the
national pastime. [...] the addition of Jackie Robinson to Branch Rickey’s Brooklyn
Dodgers in 1947 produced throngs of black fans at Dodgers’ games [...] as blacks
throughout  the  nation  flocked  to  watch  Robinson  represent  his  race  (Klarman,
1994, 58). 
27 This is a widely repeated claim but major league attendance figures do not establish that
racial  integration  on  the  playing  field  translated  into  a  box  office  bonanza  in  the
grandstand  for  the  Dodgers—or  for  the  other  teams  that  integrated  most  quickly
thereafter. Ebbets Field was only about one third full on April 10, 1947 when Robinson
made his first appearance in Brooklyn, playing for the Montreal Royals (the team he had
played for in 1946), the Dodgers’ top minor league affiliate, in a Royals-Dodgers exhibition
game, sharply down from the 25,000 attracted the year before to his local debut at Jersey
City in a Royals-Jersey City minor league game. When the Dodgers opened the 1947 season
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at Ebbets Field on April 15, with Robinson in the starting lineup, the turnout of 26,623 was
the smallest at any NL ballpark that day, and 5000 lower than at the Dodgers’ Ebbets Field
season opener the year before.  For Robinson’s second Ebbets Field game that spring,
attendance dropped to 10,252, about 3,500 fewer fans than attended a minor league game
that day across the Hudson in Newark, New Jersey. In fact, rather than seeing record
setting crowds thronging to Brooklyn’s ballpark, after fifty home games in 1947, Dodger
Ebbets Field attendance was lower than it had been in 1946 (Fetter, 1998, 186). 
28 Robinson’s  appearance  in  Dodger  flannels  did,  however,  undoubtedly  inspire
unprecedented numbers of blacks to venture into Ebbets Field for the first time. Although
the oft-cited claim that 14,000 blacks attended the Dodgers’ home opener (see Tygiel,
1983, 178; Golenbock, 2008, 159) lacks any reliable contemporaneous source5, newspapers
did  report  that  “thousands”  of  black  fans  had  been  thronging  Ebbets  Field  to  see
Robinson in action in the Dodgers’ final pre-season games (New York Times12 April 1947;
PM 11  April  1947).  Lester  Rodney,  sports  editor  of  the  Communist Daily  Workerlater
observed that “there were clearly more African-Americans in attendance [at the Dodgers’
1947 season opening game] than, say, at Opening Day the year before, though hardly the
overwhelming increase  that  some had expected and some had feared”  (Rodney,  61).
Wendell Smith estimated that a total of 25,000 blacks attended the Dodgers’ first four
games in 1947, two of which were played at Ebbets Field and two at the Giants’ Polo
Grounds home, with 10,000-15,000 in the Saturday game at the Polo Grounds and the
“remaining number turned out for the other three tilts” (PC 26 April 1947).  If  evenly
divided among those other games, that would make for about 4,000 per game. A veteran
white reporter calculated that  the percentage of  blacks in the crowd increased from
about 2 ½ percent before Robinson’s arrival to 10 percent afterwards (Roeder, 1950, 144).
That percentage apparently increased as the years passed and Rodney recalled that by
1949 about one third of the crowd at a sold out game he attended that summer was black
(Rodney, 1998, 89). 
29 By the end of Robinson’s debut 1947 season, Dodger attendance had inched above that for
the  prior  season,  1,807,000  compared  to  1,796,000.  Given  the  virtually  equivalent
attendance figures in both seasons, and the generally acknowledged significant increase
in  black  patronage,  the  number  of  white  fans  at  Ebbets  Field  must  have  dropped
substantially in Robinson’s debut season. Reports that outfielder Fred “Dixie” Walker,
theretofore the Dodgers’ most popular player known as the “the People’s Choice,” but (as
his nickname suggests) a white Southerner who was unwilling to play alongside Robinson,
was now being booed “lustily and even profanely” (White, 26 April 1947) at Ebbets Field
antagonized  some  white  fans,  one  of  whom  claimed  that  the  boos  “came  from
‘Communists, extreme left wing and bleeding heart groups,’ ” (quoted in Daily Worker26
April 1947) and indicated that the comfortably familiar atmosphere at the ballpark was
undergoing a change that would be upsetting to many of the team’s faithful followers
(Rampersad, 1997, 170;PC 19 April, 26 April 1947; New York Times11 April 1947;PM 11 April
1947). Some integration supporters may have applauded the boos directed at Walker as a
well-deserved slap at racism (Chicago Defender26 April 1947) but for many other Dodger
fans they signaled that an unsettling change was at hand, and that Dodgerdom would be
subject to the same stresses and internal divisions that were roiling the larger society. 
30 Newspaper reports of “thousands” of black fans thronging Ebbets Field may well have
discouraged a number of white fans to avoid the racial integration that now marked the
grandstand as well as the playing field (New York Times12 April 1947;PM 11 April 1947; Eig,
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2008, 52-53).  One fan even wrote Robinson himself,  complaining that the “conduct of
‘SOME’ of your race in the stands (drinking and boisterousness) could be improved upon,”
warning that such conduct (along with the booing of Walker) “will sooner or later hurt
your race to gain an equal footing in their fight for equality” (quoted in PC26 April 1947).
Civil rights leader and chairman of the National Association of Colored People (NAACP)
Walter  White felt  compelled “to plead with that  minority of  Negroes who appear to
believe a baseball game can be seen only through a haze of alcohol to postpone their
drinking until after the games in which they go to see Jackie” and to curb the “loud-
mouthed profanity, vulgarity and fighting” that had led him to eschew attending Negro
League games in recent years (White, 26 April 1947). 
31 Although at least a certain amount of the initial wariness of white fans about being part
of a crowd that included large numbers of blacks for the first time wore off after a few
months (Eig 161),  white fans never again attended Dodger home games in their pre-
Robinson numbers. Computation of “attendance strength” for major league clubs (a
measure of the “expected share of league attendance for the average major league club of
the same playing ability”) calculated as part of the congressional anti-trust inquiry into
organized baseball in 1951, showed attendance for the Dodgers in the late 1940s dropping
below historical attendance levels for teams compiling comparable won-loss records (U.S.
House, 1952, 1508).
32 The changes that the 1950s brought to Brooklyn’s population mix and the demographics
of the environs of Ebbets Field, along with the dispersal of a portion of the team’s fan base
to the automobile dependent suburbs,  hardly provide a sufficient explanation for the
lackluster level of Dodger attendance in the team’s last years in Brooklyn. Demography
and  geography  were  not  destiny,  as  the  experiences  of  teams  in  other  cities
demonstrated. Competitive performance on the field yielded box office rewards, even for
teams offering a less compelling on field attraction than that played out for Ebbets Field’s
diminishing paying customers. Comparably aging, transit and parking challenged, and
geographically  undesirable  stadium  sites  in  Cincinnati,  Chicago,  St. Louis,  and
Philadelphia bucked the trends held responsible for the Dodgers’ plight as the 1950s wore
on. At a minimum, the rest of the league registered an advance over pre-World War II
attendance  levels  that  the  Dodgers  could  not:  in  1955,  the  world  champion Dodgers
shared the distinction with the hopelessly inept last place Pittsburgh Pirates of being the
only teams in the National League drawing fewer fans to their home games than in 1941. 
33 The 1950s were a difficult decade for the baseball business in the aftermath of the boom
times of the first post-war years. However, the White Sox, the Reds, the Phillies and the
Cardinals  managed  to  attract  greater  numbers  of  fans  even  as  Dodger  attendance
declined,  although Chicago’s  Comiskey Park,  Cincinnati’s  Crosley  Field,  Philadelphia’s
Shibe Park and St. Louis’s Sportsman’s Park were no more conveniently situated or up to
date than Brooklyn’s Ebbets Field. The second division Detroit Tigers in the American
League matched the attendance marks being hit by the consistently outstanding Dodgers.
Perhaps, especially noteworthy in light of the readiness to attribute contemporary—and
to  anticipate  future—Ebbets  Field  attendance  problems  to  the  growing  minority
population in its environs (and considered off limits by the team’s white and increasingly
suburban traditional fan base) is the Philadelphia Phillies’ ability to draw almost a million
and half fans to run down, decrepit Shibe Park in 1964—far more than any Brooklyn
Dodger attendance mark in the preceding decade—despite being located in the black
ghetto of North Philadelphia, even as it was being engulfed in a major race riot that
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summer,  something  that  never  confronted  Dodger  fans  in  the  1950s  (Kuklick,  1993,
155-59). 
34 Whatever the increase in black attendance at major league games after the color line was
breached, it could not arrest the sharp downward trend in major league game attendance
in the years after Robinson’s debut which saw total major league attendance fall from
19,874,539 in 1947 to 17,462,977 in 1950. This was a downward trend in which Brooklyn
proved to be the pacesetter. Between 1947 and 1950, Dodger attendance dropped by 34%
(from 1,807,000 to 1,185, 000) while attendance in other National League cities fell by only
20%  (from  8,853,000  to  6,840,000).  In  1947,  Brooklyn  accounted  for  17%  of  total
attendance in the 8 team National League (a “premium” of 5 percentage points over its
proportionate 12% share, and even that was down from the 20% in 1946—and the 25% in
1941); in 1950 the Brooklyn percentage was down to 14%). 
35 Nor  was  Brooklyn  alone  in  failing  to  register  a  box  office  boost  from  integration.
Comparing attendance in each National League city in the last year before each team
integrated and the first season following integration reveals that integration failed to
increase attendance for seven out of the eight clubs in the league. 
Team Pre-Integration Home Attendance Post-Integration Home Attendance
Brooklyn 1,796,824 (1946) 1,398,398,967 (1948)
New York 1,459,269 (1948) 1,008,876 (1950)
Boston 1,081,795 (1949) 487,487,475 (1951)
Chicago 1,024,826 (1952) 748,183 (1954)
Pittsburgh 572,757 (1953) 469,397 (1955)
Cincinnati 548,086 (1953) 693,662 (1955)
St. Louis 880,242 (1953) 849,130 (1955)
Philadelphia 934,798 (1956) 931,110 (1958)
36 A  further  comparison  reinforces  the  conclusion  that  integration  did  not  stimulate
attendance,  with  any  increased  black  patronage  more  than  counter-balanced  by  a
massive fall off among white fans. In his recent biography of Willie Mays, James S. Hirsch
writes that
by the  time Mays  reached the  majors  [in  1951],  one  of  the  central  fears  about
integration had already been dispelled—that black players would damage the value
of a baseball franchise by alienating white fans. The experience of the Brooklyn
Dodgers and Cleveland Indians had proven that false [...]. But Mays’s arrival also
accelerated integration. His popularity proved that black players were economic
assets—Mays was baseball’s biggest attraction (Hirsch, 2010, 223).
37 Attendance figures provide little support for that view. While National League attendance
was  declining by  20% between 1947  and 1950,  attendance  in  the  virtually  lily  white
American League (in which only the Cleveland Indians were integrated in 1950 in contrast
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to the integrated rosters of the National League’s Brooklyn, New York and Boston teams
in that year), declined by less than 4%. Similarly, in contrast to the 34% decline in Dodger
attendance (and 35% decline in New York Giant attendance) between 1947 and 1950 the
cross-town Yankees, who would not field a black ball player until 1955, dropped by only
4% (from 2,178,937 to 2,081,380), although all three teams faced the same novel threats to
live attendance at their inner city ball parks, most prominently the shift in population to
suburbia and the competition from television6.
38 Finally, the way in which the baseball map was rearranged after a half century of stability
certainly did not testify to the success of racial integration as a business proposition.
Beginning with the move of the Boston Braves to Milwaukee in 1953, followed by that of
the St. Louis Browns to Baltimore in 1954 and the Philadelphia Athletics to Kansas City in
1955 and culminating with the departure of the Brooklyn Dodgers and New York Giants
for California in 1958, in each case it was the team that had outpaced a cross town rival
(the Red Sox in Boston, the Cardinals in St. Louis, the Phillies in Philadelphia and the
Yankees in New York)  in the hiring of  black ball  players that  left  town,  abandoning
traditional homes in favor of the clubs that had resisted fielding black ball players7. Racial
integration thus failed this most fundamental test of a team’s viability and staying power.
 
Conclusion
39 In recent years, scholars have paid increasing attention to the civil rights struggle in the
north in the years after World War II (Sugrue, 2008; Bondi, 2003; Chen, 2006). An overview
of the racial politics of the post-war period suggests that major league baseball faced
scant pressure from its overwhelmingly white public to integrate. Popular support was
limited for  civil  rights  initiatives generally.  In his  landmark 1944 study,  An American
Dilemma: The Negro Problem and American Democracy, Gunnar Myrdal had asserted that “the
American Negro problem is a problem in the heart of the American.” According to the
Swedish scholar, the “American Dilemma” arose out of the contradiction between the
“American Creed’s” ideals of “the essential dignity of the individual human being, of the
fundamental equality of all men, and of certain unalienable rights to freedom, justice and
a fair opportunity” and the beliefs and practices of racial discrimination and oppression
(Myrdal, 1962, xxi, 4, 24). 
40 This was, however, a “dilemma” that few white Americans acknowledged at the time. To
the extent it was, northerners viewed it as a southern problem, not one that affected
wherethey lived. A recent historian of civil rights politics noted that “a Gallup poll found
that only 6 percent of Americans supported [President Truman’s] civil rights program;
even among non-southern whites, it was favored by a mere 21 percent” (Leuchtenburg,
2005, 191). Only two percent of those polled a few weeks after the 1948 elections cited
civil  rights  or  ending  racial  discrimination  as  the  most  important  problem  facing
Congress or the president (Gallup Poll, 1972, 774). As late as July 1949—ironically enough,
on the day after Jackie Robinson affirmed the loyalty of black Americans before the House
Committee on Un-American Activities—New York’s highest court upheld the lawfulness
of  a housing development’s  refusal  to rent to black prospective tenants (“Stuyvesant
Town Negro Ban Upheld,” 20 July 1949). 
41 When it came to racial integration, baseball had arguably moved ahead of the curve of
American  public  opinion—but  its  meaning  for  the  larger  society  was  not  as  boldly
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progressive, or transformative, as it is usually made out to be. The story of “Baseball’s
Great Experiment” reveals cautious gradualism, ingrained suspicion (among both whites
and blacks)  and  enduring  conflict  as  well  as  the  more  celebratory,  and  more  often
celebrated, chronicle of Jackie Robinson’s victory for racial justice and the highest values
of the American Creed.
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NOTES
1.  When examined more closely, Veeck actually held out modest expectations of the pace of
change in the sport’s racial lineup, predicting only that within ten years Negro players will be in
regular service with big league teams(New York Times, 4 July 1947).
2.  Perhaps, however, this was the ever crafty Rickey’s way of discouraging Dodger rivals from
following his own example and maintaining Brooklyn’s head start in raiding the Negro Leagues
for playing talent that yielded rookie of the year award winners in 1947, 1949, 1952 and 1953 and
three  starting  position  players  (Robinson  and  Jim  Gilliam  in  the  infield,  Roy  Campanella  at
catcher) during the 1953 season when there were only about 20 blacks in all of major league
baseball. 
3.  In similar fashion, the same page featured pictures of Abraham Lincoln and Bill Veeck with
the respective captions “. . . freed the Negroes (. . . ); gives ‘em baseball jobs. ”
4.  Conolly relies on and cites Karl E. Taeuber and Alma F. Taeuber, Negroes in Cities: Residential
Segregation and Neighborhood Change, New York, 1969 and Annemette Sorensen, Karl E. Taeuber,
and Leslie J. Hollingsworth, Jr., “Indexes of Racial residential Segregation for 109 Cities in the
United States, 1940-1970”, Institute for Research on Poverty (February 1970).
5.  This  oft-cited  claim  is  apparently  based  on  a  single  uncredited  assertion  of  unknown
reliability in the Sporting News on 23 April 1947. It is not confirmed by any other contemporary
source and is not corroborated by the attendance estimates of Wendell Smith cited below.
6.  The possible negative impact of integration on Brooklyn Dodger, as well as New York Giant,
attendance is raised (but not answered) in Lowenfish, 2008, 52-61.
7.  Seasons in which the teams that moved fielded black ball players: Brooklyn Dodgers (1947); St.
Louis Browns (1947); New York Giants (1949); Boston Braves (1950); Philadelphia A’s (1953). The
Browns signed three black ball players in mid-July 1947. They were all released a month later and
the Browns did not field another black ball player until 1951 (Tygiel, 219-222, 285). Seasons in
which the teams that stayed first fielded blacks: Boston Red Sox (1959); St. Louis Cardinals (1954);
Philadelphia Phillies (1957); New York Yankees (1955).
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